PERSONAL REMEMBRANCE
LARRY K. GIFFORD
In response to 1st Recon Battalion’s request for stories
about long-range Recon patrols in harm’s way, I, Larry K.
Gifford as platoon Sgt. For Charlie Company can contribute accurate
accounts of typical dangerous events in which I was a participant.
Charlie Co. originally had been 326 Recon attached to 1st Force
Recon on hill 34 which under the direction of Ssgt.John F. Hare
evolved into Alpha 5th Recon attached to 1st Force. In 1970 1st
Force moved to the South China Secured Area near Monkey mountain
and therefore Platoons 126, 226 and 326 which constituted Alpha
5th Recon then moved to Camp Reasoner, the headquarters for 1st
Recon Battalion.
Three long-range Recon patrols which our company of about 20 men
ran up to 2 March 1970 when I was severely wounded in my last
patrol with Lt. Skibbe and Capt. McVey who lost their lives and
finally were left in the jungle to this day in the Thuong Duc
will be presented in a chronological order from Jan.-Mar. 1970.
A further synopsis of the Recovery effort for them/their remains
follows. This was an historic event in that our seven man Recon
team intercepted the point element of three NVA divisions (c.
30,000 troops) on the border between Laos and South Vietnam.
In January 1970, I led a seven man Recon team into the Que Son
mountains. Mike Simpson acted as asst. team leader and point man.
The jungle terrain was steep and very dense with clean and clear
running creeks for fresh water. Within a few days we had come
upon a six foot trail and discovered some tunnels with underground
sleeping quarters lined with bamboo mats and caches of live AK-47
rounds. In one of the sheltered areas we found a skeleton clad
in part of an NVA uniform which may explain why they seemed to
have abandoned the tunnel complex, given the Vietnamese superstitious
avoidance of the dead. We recovered the NVA belt and its buckle
and took the skull and its femur bones. (The skull can be seen
in the picture of me on 1 March 1970, the day I was promoted to
sergeant.) South of where we were, we could hear the sounds of
clucking chickens and pounding and from prior experience this
indicated that we were very close to an NVA base camp being restored
or set up. The immediate area was formed like a horseshoe shaped
bowl with a steep southern hillside to protect their position.
We had often seen similar encampments. We were on high alert and
moved slowly past a 2 foot wide by ten foot length deep ditch
containing human feces.
About 150 meters south past the trail, we set up our harbor site.
We placed just two claymore mines to support cross intersecting
fields of fire to protect our spot. Then we situated the skull
and crossed femur bones in front of the mines to spook any enemy
that may near our area. We seldom appreciated the rain but that
night it seemed to absorb our coughing in spite of making us miserable
We could see that there was a large bonfire on the trail, perhaps
to light the way for incoming troops. We radioed the information
back to headquarters.The next morning we received orders to get
even closer to the enemy and cross the trail to the bowl protected
by the mountainous area. I immediately asked to speak to Captain
McVey to whom I explained the danger of doing this with so many
NVA around as we would have to work our way through them. He agreed
with me and sent out a OV 10 fixed wing aircraft for an aerial
observation of the situation. The pilot reported that he could
see approximately 120 NVA soldiers walking down one of the draws
from the top of the mountain into the base camp at the bottom
of the bowl. We survived the night and in the early morning, I had the team
circle west and then turn south to get into a position at the
end of the base camp. To get there, Simpson, our point man, elected
for us to cross through a large stand of elephant grass as the
safest route to where we needed to be. Jones challenged him on
his point movement, not wanting to endure the horror of the elephant
grass. I moved close to him and suggested that he “knock
that shit off or I’d have to cut his throat.” Drama
rules! The elephant grass was over six feet tall and above our
heads which gave us good cover but it lacerates you wherever it
touches you and when its pollen gets into the bloodstream, one
breaks out in an intolerably itchy rash. As we emerged from the
grass we espied another 18-inch wide tunnel entrance on the side
of the hill. We hunkered down immediately alert when suddenly
from the tunnel a deep-throated growl from a tiger at the entrance
just six to eight feet away watched us waving its head from side
to side. We all were ready to protect ourselves as we backed away
as quietly and slowly from its menace, but God was with us, and
the tiger did not attack us and expose our presence to the enemy.
(It was then that I realized why the military issued us khaki
underwear.) We made our way to near an open area and set up a
harbor for the night. After a day’s extension the CH-46
came in and extracted us.
Charlie Company’s members are listed as I remember them,
but not limited to others: L/Cpl Mike Simpson, PFC Ezekiel Pierce,
Jr. (Bro Zeke de Mau Mau) Cpl Steve Plunkett, HM3 Larry McGlyn,
L/Cpl William C. James, L/Cpl Wayne Ritchie, Cpl...Schulthess,
L/Cpl Roy Gates, Jr, L/Cpl James A. Paras (Greek), L/Cpl Roy Jones,
L/Cpl Gary Moreno, L/Cpl Richard Shawver, Michael Willis (Frog)
and Sgt Larry K. Gifford. In February 1970, another seven man Recon team with me as team
leader and Mike Simpson as asst. team leader and point, were inserted
into the Que Son mountains. Roy Lee Jones acted as tail-end Charlie.
After a couple days of searching we discovered an active rocket
position. We counted over fifty-six rockets shot from there that
day, with the ordinance traveling over hill 800 and down into
the valley below, almost due North. The rounds were targeted on
a South Vietnamese Special Forces camp. Our team moved carefully
closer to their base camp and that night we observed the enemy
moving along the jungle floor with torches adding additional support
for the rocket launch position. We were within 200 meters of the
(we surmised) NVA columns. After they seemed to have gotten settled
and no more troops were noted to be approaching, I called in a
battery of 105 artillery rounds. The first strike hit quite near
the enemy but the second strike hit much nearer our position.
A piece of shrapnel the size of my fist hit about four inches
above Jones’ back who was lying right next to me. How the
batteries may have decided to walk in the rounds clearly endangered
our Recon position so I aborted the bombardment. Over the next couple days we made our way climbing up the ridgeback
leading out of the lower jungle area toward a higher elevation
for less risk of being killed by ‘friendly’, not to
mention ‘hostile’ fire and to establish a better observation
post. No more rockets were fired that day. When we finally reached
the summit, we found an area of about thirty-five meters in circumference
where we set up booby traps and hunkered down to protect ourselves
and observe the enemy below us more clearly. Once we were settled,
we heard from the rear area (pun intended). They wanted us to
cross over to hill 800 because we determined the enemy must have
an OP spotting position there, directing the outgoing rockets.
I asked to speak to Capt McVey to apprise him of the situation.
I reported that there was quite literally no cover adequate enough
for us to sneak over there. Capt McVey heeded my advice and ordered
another team dispatched to near that area
which was almost over-run as they tried unsuccessfully twice to
be inserted. The enemy was everywhere. Every night our team rappelled
off the Cliffside of that summit and simply hung in mid-air to
sleep. Our rucksacks were connected by parachute harnesses that
enabled us to do this. Through each night two men stood watch
at the head of the trail in radio communication with our OP. On
the first night Jones and I stood watch. Just as darkness fell,
we could barely discern them, but a couple of the enemy approached
our ambush site through the fog. We tensed not wanting to have
to fire and alert the rest of the enemy of our presence. I was
so anxious that the back of my tongue ached. They stood for a
moment looking around, then seemingly decided no one was there
and with a last look turned back down the hill. My tongue softened
enough for me to swallow and take a deep breath. After that incident
we were extended for yet another day due to the rain (perpetual,
it seemed) and poor visibility. We were finally extracted in a
blaze of small-arms fire. On the following day a fixed-wing OV-10
aerial observer detected the enemy encampment and with our and
its co-ordinates, a B-52 arc-light strike destroyed the enemy
encampment. In the days following that Recon patrol, a class was given to
honor the team and to show how a successful Recon patrol happens.
I went to the air force base for three days of R&R. I remember
they had good chow and hot water showers. “Yeah!”
One day in February, the battalion commander, LtCol Drumright
and a new officer Lt Skibbe, were traveling by train when the
enemy blew it off the tracks. LtCol Drumright was trapped beneath
the wreckage and Lt Skibbe pulled him out from beneath it. Drumright
told me that Skibbe had saved his life that day while under attack
by enemy ground forces. These two marines captured two of the
enemy. Drumright and Skibbe held them under guard with their .45s
and began to interrogate them for information about the NVA troops,
their numbers and movement. They steadfastly refused to talk when
one suddenly attempted to to get to his feet and Drumright shot
and killed him. The other man began to spew out the information
about Gen. Bien and the 375 Division . Drumright knew of this
leader but not the whereabouts of his division or their mission
until then. Lt Skibbe and LtCol Drumright had just transferred to 1st Recon
BN from 26 Marines as we all had done. Shortly thereafter LtCol
Drumright selected our platoon due to our good reputation for
insertion into that area indicated by the information obtained
from the captured enemy.
Lt Skibbe was team leader and I was the assistant team leader
of the seven man Recon team to be inserted into the Thuong Duc
province. Lt Skibbe had not been on a Recon patrol before and
asked me to direct our actions since I knew the men and had experienced
11 such insertions. He wanted to learn from all of us. Cpl Plunkett,
point man, Roy Lee Jones, tail-end Charlie, L/Cpl Moreno, primary
radioman, Zeke, secondary radioman and Corpman HM3 McGlyn with
Lt Skibbe and I constituted our Recon team with the call sign,
“Thin Man”. The book by Michael Hodgins, Reluctant Warrior, opens with a
brief, judgmental version of the story about that patrol and its
outcome. I am now telling the story of what I experienced and
remember of that day. I have spoken to the other men who survived
and their accounts are nearly identical to mine except where their
point of view is due to a different positioning. We were inserted at a flat area about two hundred meters from
the valley floor. We discovered some barbed wire and c-rat cans.
Jones pointed out the clouds of flies that were present. He knew
from experience that the enemy was probably very near. As we began
to move upwards along a narrowing ridgeback we realized the steep
cliffs on each side probably did not provide the enemy enough
room for an ambush. We moved along stealthily with frequent rests
due to the steep terrain, until we came to a widening of the ridgeline
in a grove of bamboo. We grew more wary. As we emerged from the
bamboo we suddenly realized that we had intersected with a trail
leading upwards from the river below and on our right. The six
foot wide trail continued upwards as the jungle thinned and our
only cover was the presence of rather large boulders. After about
60 feet I stopped the team because the trail swung to the left
for about another 60 feet then right where it steepened and was
out of our visual field. All of us could see that a deadly ambush
could be set up and awaiting us. I spoke very softly with Lt Skibbe and we agreed to split the
team with one to guard the trail behind us leading to the river
and the other to repel a frontal attack. Plunkett, the point moved
out in front of us from boulder to boulder as we took the only
defensible positions behind the boulders nearest our selves. Since
I was the acting team leader I felt responsible to be front and
center in the least desirable and most exposed position to watch
the trail in front of us and defend us at the same time. Lt Skibbe
set up to my
immediate left where I’d positioned him behind a large boulder
and told him to watch and wait and not to move. Suddenly the silence
was broken by Cpl Plunkett shouting, “Gooks”. He immediately
began to return the hail of fire that had erupted from the enemy.
Two of them suddenly appeared rushing straight at me about 15
feet away. They were armed with AK-47 submachine guns on full
auto and I noted the mud camouflage on their faces. As I began
to return fire I got hit in the head with one of the first bursts
from the enemy. I was momentarily stunned and was unable to even
see them because the air and my eyes were filled with blood, dust
and gun smoke. I continued after a moment to return fire in an
attempt to establish fire superiority. We were all shooting to
save each other and stop the enemy when suddenly I took another
bullet through my thigh and then another through my right thumb
knuckle which continued into the front hand guard and bolt assembly
rendering my rifle inoperable, useless except as a club. At this
point I lay down and played possum. From my face in the dirt I
dimly noted another six of the enemy performing a fire-team rush.
They had come down from where the trail disappeared from view
but due to a lack of cover had to jump over onto a steep bank.
Some were hit. I suddenly felt hands on the back of my collar
and was dragged and thrown by Lt Skibbe who had left the shelter
of the boulders exposing himself leaping over some to haul me
to safety. He staggered and fell having taken a bullet that shattered
his ankle. I remember thinking, “why didn’t the Lt
stay behind the rock where I put him?” But, to this day
I can only remember him as a man who heroically risked his life
to save me which eventually resulted in his death. Within moments
‘Doc’ McGlyn showed up to administer to both of us
at great risk to his own life. For the next three hours, we repulsed several enemy fire-team
rushes and managed to hold our position. Zeke had moved forward
up the trail followed by a hailstorm of bullets to increase our
fire superiority and only later discovered that one bullet had
gone right through his pants leg. Doc McGlyn had placed a brace
on our Lt’s ankle to provide upright support. I began to
crawl back to Moreno since I couldn’t walk with the wound
in my thigh in order to call in an air strike, but ‘Doc’
stopped me and told me I had adequately trained the men for them
to call in an air strike without my help. Cpl Plunkett assisted
L/Cpl Moreno by calling the OV-10 aerial observer to get some
air support here STAT. OV-10 responded that two F-4 Phantoms were
en route and we should throw out some ‘willy peder’
to mark where the enemy was just west of our position
The scream of their engines alerted us to ‘dig in’
for cover. I remember seeing the one of the Phantoms go by straight
overhead about ten feet above the tree line. The two bombs hit
so close together it sounded like one horrendous explosion. They
must have impacted no more than 100 feet away and all of us were
lifted right off the ground and when I slammed back to the earth
the breath was nearly knocked out of me. A moment later we all
turned face down and covered the back of our heads with our arms
as the rain of rocks and branches pummeled us. Within minutes a CH-46 helicopter flew in and the 50 cal. machine
gunner was mowing down everything in the direction of the enemy,
while dropping its stable- rig rescue ladder, as it was a ‘hot’
recovery. The jungle penetrator then was lowered and I was hoisted
onto the bird. It descended again to pick up Lt Skibbe. The rest
of the Recon men had already hooked onto the ladder while Lt Skibbe
was being lifted up when the bird ascended and veered away. Something
went terribly wrong. The jungle penetrator with Lt Skibbe suddenly
broke loose above the trees and he fell back into the jungle and
the ‘hot’ LZ. Some of the team could see him on the
jungle floor. There was no way for the helicopter to return for
him at that point as we were already taking heavy ground fire
and the ladder with the team on it was still suspended below.
Our helplessness deepened our sense of loss. N.B. I was not witness to what follows but learned it from some
who had participated in the following incidents. Upon landing back at Da Nang, Capt McVey was informed of the
bad news. He rounded up Simpson and a few other team members along
with some volunteer Recon marines and flew back that very evening
to locate Skibbe. When they reached the impact zone two basketball
flares were dropped to illuminate the area. Capt McVey was descending
on the jungle penetrator into that hellhole when the flares drifted
behind the side of the high mountain. The pilot decided to bring
the captain back up. As he was preparing to enter the helicopter,
Capt McVey shaking his head in frustration handed his rifle in
to Col Drumright. At that moment the bird skidded to one side
and ascended to about 500 feet above the ground. The jungle penetrator
snapped and the Captain fell into the canopy of the jungle below. With the loss of the two officers, BN mustered a volunteer force
with participants from Recon Charlie Company, an army special
forces unit and
approximately one hundred twenty-five Vietnamese CID and Mike
forces to return to the area. BN was aware of the large contingent
of NVA troops still in the area, but on 6 March 70 the recovery
team arrived at the area. On that day two CH-46 helicopters descended
into the hot zone at the foot of the mountain. One of the helicopters
was destroyed while landing with two dead and eighteen wounded.
Air support from F-4 Phantoms dropped bombs to disable the enemy.
All night long mortars and small arms fire kept the 150 friendly
forces in a static position. The next morning the firestorm of
enemy mortars, small arms fire and RPGs resulted in the CIDs advancing
up the hill to get severely mauled with at least six deaths and
many wounded. Meanwhile, the mortars were being walked in towards
the Recon team and Mike Simpson realized that they were definitely
in harm’s way and urged the Recon team to move to safer
positions. He sought out Greek and James to regroup the Recon
team which included Plunkett, Doc McGlyn and their team leader,
1st /LT Polster to lead the large force of men out of the dangerous
location and into the enemy stronghold. However, there was a sudden
roar of enemy claymores that decimated the CIDs even further.
Plunkett, and Simpson acting as point men discovered a mortar
site at a bunker that was preparing to move closer to hit the
site of the new harbor. This enemy group was eliminated. At night “Spooky” was called in and worked over the
area occupied by the dense concentration of enemy troops and protected
the harbor site of the recovery force. The recovery force could
not justify further losses (at least 15 dead and 53 wounded) in
searching for Capt McVey and Lt Skibbe and so withdrew the force
from the field. This history is as I experienced and remember it. Much of this
information is documented in a confidential report issued by Headquarters,
1st Reconnaissance Battalion, 1st Marine Division. (5 April 1970)
To have been a member of such courageous and excellent
Marines has been one of the proudest experiences in my life.
Submitted by: Larry K. Gifford, Former Sergeant, USMC



|