UNITED
STATES MARINE CORPS
1ST
RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION
IN
REPLY REFER TO:
5750
S-3/blg
9
Jul 03
From:
Commanding Officer, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division
(G-3)
Subj:
COMMAND CHRONOLOGY FOR THE PERIOD OF
(b)
FMFPacO 5750.8E
(c)
DivO 5750.7D
Encl:
(1) 1st Reconnaissance Battalion Command Chronology
1. In accordance with the references, enclosure
(1) is submitted.
2. This document is unclassified.
R. E. Talkington
FIRST RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION COMMAND
CHRONOLOGY
1 JANUARY TO
SECTION I ORGANIZATIONAL
DATA
SECTION II NARRATIVE
SUMMARY
SECTION III SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
SECTION IV LIST
OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
SECTION I
ORGANIZATIONAL DATA
1. Unit Designation
1st
Reconnaissance Battalion
1st
Marine Division
a. Reporting Unit Code: 11060
b. Table of Organization Numbers: 1423A/1424B
c. Period Covered:
2. Personnel Information
a. Commanding Officer:
Commanding Officer:
b. Executive Officer:
c. Subordinate Commanders:
1. Company Commander, Headquarters and Service Company
Albert R. Mendoza, Capt 01 Jan – 30 Jun
2.
Company Commander, A Company
Bryan E. Patterson, Capt 01 Jan – 30 Jun
3.
Company Commander, B Company
Craig R. Schwetje, Capt 01 Jan – 30 Jun
4.
Company Commander, C Company Brian L. Gilman, Capt 01 Jan – 30 Apr
Brian T. Rideout, Capt 01 May – 30 Jun
5.
Commanding Officer, D Company, 4th Reconnaissance Battalion
Andrew T. Roberto, Maj 01 Jan – 30 Jun
d. Principal Staff Members
1. Intelligence Officer
Brian T. Rideout, Capt 01 Jan – 30 Apr
Adam S. Conway, Capt 01 May – 30 Jun
2. Operations Officer
Richard W. Whitmer, Maj 01 Jan – 30 Apr
3.
Communications Officer
Aaron P. McFarland, Capt 01 Jan – 30 Jun
4. Supply Officer
Stephen F. Wildt, 1stLt 01 Jan – 30 Jun
5. Air Officer
Brian R. Peterson, Capt 01 Jan – 13 May
e. Staff Historian
f. Senior Enlisted Personnel:
1.
Sergeant Major
2.
Company First Sergeant, H&S Company
3.
Company First Sergeant, A Company
4.
Company First Sergeant, B Company
5.
Company First Sergeant, C Company
6. Company
First Sergeant, D Company, 4th
Reconnaissance Battalion
Robert J. Cottle, 1stSgt 01 Jan – 30 Jun
SECTION II
NARRATIVE SUMMARY
In January of 2003, 1st
Reconnaissance Battalion deployed to
The battalion initially
was in general support of the division, but was detached to RCT-1 for the
majority of the war. Through a process of trial and error the companies learned
to plan and execute fragmentary orders on short timelines. Missions assigned to
the battalion included screens, convoy security, a battalion level deliberate
attack, strongpoint operations, CASEVAC recovery, team through battalion sized
reconnaissance, combat and security patrols, defensive operations, blocking
positions, personnel and vehicle searches, establishing traffic control points,
reconnaissance in force, humanitarian operations, and raids.
On
On
23 March the battalion conducted a tactical road march up MSR Tampa towards An
Nasiriyah. On 24 March the battalion experienced its first direct combat
against hostile forces, establishing a Support By Fire (SBF) position on the
south side of the Euphrates River near the An Nasiriyah bridge in support of a
planned 1st Marines attack into An Nasiriyah. Companies A and C engaged enemy forces with
sniper, small arms, and heavy machine gun fire accounting for 12 suspected
enemy kills. Approximately two hours after establishing the SBF position, RCT
1’s attack was delayed and the battalion was pulled back.
Following 3/1’s successful
attack into An Nasiriyah, the battalion crossed the
As the
battalion approached Al Gharraf, the lead company, Company A, began receiving
fire from a platoon sized Fedayeen element in the city. Company A suppressed the enemy element with
its organic weapons and called in artillery, achieving good effects and silencing
the enemy element. The battalion
immediately continued its movement through Al Gharraf in order to link up with
RCT 1 on Route 7 on the other side of the city.
The battalion was the first friendly unit into Al Gharraf. During the movement through the city, the
entire battalion was engaged with small arms, RPG and machine gun fire. The battalion accounted for 1 confirmed enemy
killed (dressed in civilian clothes) as well as a platoon-sized element
silenced with indirect fire. The
battalion suffered its first casualty during this battle - a corporal from
Company B received a gunshot wound to his forearm.
On 26 March, the battalion
moved to Al Rifa and established a strongpoint defense along Route 7 IOT
facilitate RCT 1’s movement north on Route 7.
Enemy forces were spotted on rooftops in town. The battalion called a fire for effect on an
enemy OP on a rooftop accounting for 6 suspected enemy
killed. Friendly heavy weapons fire was
received while the battalion strong pointed Al Rifa. No friendly forces were
injured. Company C was detached and
attached to RCT-1’s Headquarters Company IOT protect the RCT’s log trains as
they transited north on Route 7. The
Company destroyed one Fedayeen technical vehicle as it approached the rear of
the RCT’s trains, killing five Fedayeen personnel.
On the night of 26 March,
the battalion received a short fuse tasker to conduct reconnaissance of Qalat
Sikar airfield in order to support a planned seizure of the airfield by
On 31
March 1st Recon Battalion conducted a reconnaissance in force along
Route 7a (an unimproved road that paralleled the western bank of the Al Gharraf
River). During this reconnaissance, the
battalion was tasked with establishing a blocking position on Route 7 north of
Al Hayy. During the reconnaissance the
battalion tripped an ambush approximately 15 kilometers south of Al Hayy. The ambush was quickly defeated with organic
weapons and rotary wing CAS. As the
battalion moved over the Al Gharraf River north of Al Hayy it tripped another
ambush, receiving RPG, machine gun and mortar fire. The battalion quickly suppressed this ambush
with its organic heavy weapons and pushed through to Route 7. Upon consolidation on Route 7, the battalion
occupied a BP where it subsequently received BM-21 impacts 500 meters from its
location. Artillery was called,
destroying 1 enemy artillery piece, 5 trucks, and 4 personnel.
On 1 April the battalion continued its
reconnaissance north on Route 7a IOT protect the western flank of RCT 1. Upon receiving enemy mortar fire and locating
their firing position, the battalion employed fixed wing CAS destroying the mortar
position. As it continued its movement
north, the battalion again came into contact with Fedayeen forces in vicinity
of Al Muwaffaqiyah (Al Muf). A division
of AH-1W’s was employed as well as 3 fire for effect
artillery missions against enemy positions in surrounding buildings. An enemy platoon sized element was suspected
to be destroyed.
On 2 April the
battalion was tasked to screen north along Route 7a to the 86 northing IOT
protect RCT 1’s flank. As the battalion
attempted to cross the bridge over the
On 3 April
the battalion established a BP at the 70 northing along Route 7 where it remained
in place through 4 April. The battalion
processed in excess of 300 displaced persons (DPs) as they fled Al Kut and
On 5 April the battalion
relieved 2/23 on it’s blocking position vic of the
intersection of Routes 27 and 6 north of An Numinayah. The battalion commander decided to conduct
split operations leaving Companies A and D at the BP while the rest of the
battalion pushed forward to the Division Main CP located on the outskirts of
On 6 April
the battalion rear element conducted a relief in place with 2nd LAR
and rejoined the battalion forward at the Division Main CP. For the following
day the battalion conducted rest, refitting, and mission planning for an attack
north to Ba Qubah.
On 8 April the battalion, reinforced with a LAR
company, conducted a reconnaissance in force to Ba Qubah. Approximately 30 miles north of
The
battalion continued its reconnaissance in force at dawn on 9 April. The battalion employed a two-axis attack with
Company A and C on an eastern axis and the LAR company
and Company B on the western axis with Company D maintaining rear
security. Multiple firefights occurred
as the battalion attacked north. These
tactics produced excellent results and defeated a well-entrenched enemy on the
approaches to Ba Qubah. Four fixed wing
sections, three rotary wing divisions, and eight mortar fire missions were
called on enemy forces. Enemy forces
suffered 6 confirmed KIA as well as a platoon plus suspected KIA. The battalion destroyed three BMPs, two T-72
MBTs, and six enemy mortars with weapons ranging from JDAMs to TOWs to
AT-4s. Ammunition located and destroyed
included 450 82mm mortar rounds, 6 mortar tubes and 10,000 7.62 rounds. When the battalion reached the outskirts of
Ba Qubah, Companies A, B and D as well as the LAR Company established blocking
positions along the approaches to the city while Company C conducted a
reconnaissance of the Iraqi 41st Armored Brigade and Al Nida
Republican Guard Headquarters Garrisons.
Company C found both garrisons abandoned and captured battle colors of
the 41st Brigade. Upon
conclusion of this reconnaissance, the battalion withdrew to the Division Main
CP without incident.
On 10
April the battalion occupied a regime complex near the
On 13
April the battalion moved to a power plant vicinity of MC405057 in order to
conduct security operations and defend the power plant against looters. From this location the battalion conducted 17
platoon sized patrols over the next 4 days.
These patrols performed multiple missions such as locating UXO, locating
abandoned military equipment, projecting a presence in the area, halting
looting and lawlessness and providing water and medical aid to residents of the
local community. During this time period
the following weapons were located and reported for future destruction by
EOD: 1 SA-6 missile and launcher, 4 HIP
helos, 1 AAA gun, 3 S-60s, 4 T-72s, 5 BMPs,
5 BRDMs, 2 14.5mm AA guns, 6 120mm mortars, 300 SA-16s, 6 SA-14s, 1 ZPU,
and 6 SA-7s. In addition to these
weapons, the following ammunition was found: Approximately 100 rockets for
helos, 5 cases of AAA gun ammo, 6000 14.5mm AA rounds, and an ammo dump
100m long X 20m wide and 2m deep. This ammo dump contained an estimated 20,000
lbs of ordnance to include: mortars, missiles, RPGs, MG ammo, and over 500 land
mines. The battalion remained at the
power station and provided security on the adjacent petrol facility until 18
April when it staged at
On 19 April battalion conducted a route
reconnaissance along
Routes 5, 8 and 1 to vicinity of
In the early morning hours
of 21 April RCT 1 tasked the battalion to mark the minefield identified the day
before. Two CEB Marines attached to the
battalion were injured when an anti-personnel mine
exploded while they were marking the minefield. Both Marines were severely
injured and were evacuated via air. An additional Recon Marine received minor
injuries and was treated on location.
The
battalion remained in the TAA vicinity of
SECTION
III
SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
15
Jan Company A and H&S
Company embark aboard USS
17
Jan Company A and H&S
Company deploy aboard USS
Freedom
30
Jan Company C deploys via air
transport to
31
Jan Company C arrives in
03 Feb Company B and Battalion HQ (Fwd)
deploy via
air
transport to
Operation Iraqi Freedom
03
Feb Company D, 4th
Reconnaissance Battalion
mobilized
04
Feb Company B and Battalion HQ
(Fwd) arrive in
07
Feb Company D, 4th
Reconnaissance Battalion
arrives
at
Reconnaissance Battalion
10
Feb Companies B and C and
Battalion HQ (Fwd)
move
from
Support Area (LSA)
14
Feb Company D deploys via air
transport to
16
Feb Company D arrives in
Matilda
24
Feb – 28 Feb A
Company & H&S Company offload from USS
04
Feb – 17 Mar 1st
Reconnaissance Battalion (Recon
Bn)conducts
training, planning and material
readiness preparation in LSA Matilda and
17
Mar Recon Bn moves to its
assigned
dispersal
area in northern
17
Mar – 20 Mar Recon Bn conducts final
preparations for
combat
in dispersal area
21
Mar Recon Bn crosses line of
departure entering
western
flank from the LD to Route 7. The
battalion
identifies and reports two
minefields
enroute.
22
Mar – 23 Apr See Tab A
23
Apr – 23 May Recon Bn occupied TAA Ad
Diwaniyah and made
preparations
for redeployment
24
Apr – 25 Apr Recon Bn moves from TAA Ad
Diwaniyah to LSA
5,
25
Apr – 3 Jun Recon Bn conducts
redeployment preparations
and
embarks for redeployment at LSA 5,
30
Apr Captain Brian L. Gilman
relinquishes command
of
Company C to Captain Brian T. Rideout.
Captain Gilman assumes duties
as Battalion
Operations
Officer.
3 Jun
– 4 Jun Recon Bn redeploys via air
transport to
CONUS
4 Jun Recon Bn arrives at
11
Jun LtCol Stephen A. Ferrando
relinquishes
command
of 1st Reconnaissance Battalion
to
LtCol Rory E. Talkington
13
Jun – 30 Jun Recon Bn conducts
post-deployment leave
SECTION IV
LIST OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
TAB A 1st Reconnaissance
Battalion Operation Iraqi
Freedom Operations Matrix
TAB B 1st Reconnaissance
Battalion Operation Iraqi
Freedom After
Action Report
In January of 2003, 1st Reconnaissance
Battalion deployed to
1. TOPIC:
FRAGMENTARY ORDERS AND COMMANDER’S INTENT
DISCUSSION:
The battalion conducted multiple missions from short Frags and short
timelines and did very well in this mode.
After about 7 Frags, platoon commanders raised the concern that on some
occasions, they were getting tasks and a scheme of maneuver, but not getting
commander’s intent. From that point on,
if commander’s intent was not issued with the Frag, the company commander asked
for it. Both the battalion and the
company immediately improved on issuing commander’s intent with the Frags.
RECOMMENDATION: This is a lesson re-learned: no matter how short the Frag, always communicate
commander’s intent. If you communicate
nothing else, communicate commander’s intent.
2. TOPIC: VEHICLE ORGANIZATION FOR DESERT
OPERATIONS
DISCUSSION: The line company’s HMMWVs
required significant modifications in order to make them a feasible platform
for employment given the spectrum of possible taskings we anticipated. Some of these modifications were made based
on prior experience; others were made as the result of trial and error. Some modifications were not made due to
inadequate materials or time, but are recommended.
RECOMMENDATION: The following modifications
should be made to the HMMWV:
1. Each vehicle should be equipped
with gas spout/funnel
2. 12 feet of tow chain on the front
and back
3. Wire cutters
4. Plug kit
5. Slave cable per platoon
6. Power inverter per section
7. Armor plate for turret
8. Mount for thermal optics (PAS-13
or replacement)
9. Do not remove windshields
10. Remove doors (non-armored
HMMWVs)
11. VRC mount
with speaker
12. brackets
to stow AT-4s
13. brackets
to stow spare barrel
14. SAW mounts
3. TOPIC: TRAINING FOR MOUNTED PATROLS
DISCUSSION: The company
acquired all of the weapons, weapon mounts and equipment needed to conduct
mounted patrols approximately two weeks prior to deployment and received its
full compliment of vehicles just three weeks prior to crossing the line of
departure. Due to these material restrictions
as well as competing training interests in CONUS (support to Division
Exercises, CAX, etc.) and restrictions on available training areas and time in
Kuwait, the battalion was unable to attain proficiency in all required tasks
prior to crossing the Line of Departure.
Training was maximized given these restraints, but the company only
attained familiarity, vice proficiency, in some key tasks prior to crossing the
line of departure. Aggressive execution
and improvisation by the lieutenants, SNCOs and NCOs ensured mission success,
but more training prior to crossing the line of departure would have resulted
in less friction during execution.
RECOMMENDATION: More emphasis should be
placed on mobile patrolling to include patrolling in urban areas, gunnery
package for both the M2 and Mk 19 that includes biannual recertification, night
driving, vehicle hides, and maneuver training. Training should be conducted at
the section, platoon, company, and battalion level. A combat SOP should be
developed for mobilized patrolling from the TT&P developed during this
deployment.
4.
TOPIC: THERMAL IMAGERY CAPABILITY
DISCUSSION: Lunar illumination during the initial weeks of the war
was low. During the C Company’s
RECOMMENDATION: Every vehicle should have
enhanced thermal capability to accomplish assigned missions,
PAS-13 does not have the necessary range.
5.
TOPIC: COMMUNICATION CHALLENGES
DISCUSSION: Inter-platoon communication was
a constant challenge because the PRC-148s lost time consistently. This resulted
in a slower tempo and some loss in flexibility within the company.
RECOMMENDATION: If operating solely on MSRs
where line of site will not be an issue, use UHF on the 148s as the platoon TAC
and have each vehicle monitor company TAC on a PRC-119 or VRC if available. If line of sight may become an issue due to
terrain or dispersion, use 119Fs for inter-platoon communications, as allowed
by quantity of 119Fs available.
6. TOPIC: ATTACHMENTS FOR ANTI-ARMOR
MISSIONS
DISCUSSION: C Company’s first Fragmentary
order while in country was a screen mission against a reported 10-12 tanks. Our
weapons were limited to AT-4s, Mk-19s and .50 cal SLAP ammunition. Due to time restrictions, we were unable to
coordinate for anti-armor attachments.
We could accomplish the assigned screen mission (i.e., report, provide
early warning and fight only in self defense), but we had no way to interdict
armor with organic weapon systems.
RECOMMENDATION: Each company should have
limited anti-armor assets that range out to two kilometers for standoff and
force protection. If anti-armor assets
cannot be attained for the company TO&E, then anti-armor attachments should
be provided when assigned a mission where contact with enemy armor is probable
or likely.
7. TOPIC:
T/E
DISCUSSION: Valuable pieces of equipment at the company
level were sniper rifles, long range optics to include 15 X 80 binos, thermal
imagers, NVG’s, HMMWVs, and heavy machine guns in that order. Snipers were very
important in this operation. Their specialization in observation skills and
knowledge of optics were critical to mission accomplishment. During several
engagements, their ability to engage specific targets at long range prevented
collateral damage. PVS 7B NVG’s are still
in use throughout the battalion. These are restrictive because both eyes are
covered up.
RECOMMENDATION: Sniper school and other observational skills
need to receive higher priority within the battalion training plan. The
battalion needs to upgrade to PVS-14s to outfit its whole T/O. PVS 14s offer the ability to see with both
eyes keeping one on night vision and the other free. The above listed items will assist the
Marines in every environment. T/E changes should be addressed to incorporate
the above.
8. TOPIC: C2
DISCUSSION: Companies built their C2 structure to support
maneuver operations in this environment.
The fight was at the company and platoon level throughout much of this
operation.
RECOMMENDATION: The recon community is
flexible enough to adjust to these environments. I do not believe that we need
to look like an infantry battalion. Our success proved that we can structure
our companies to fight this fight and revert back to traditional recon
operations if needed.
9. TOPIC: ASSIGNMENT OF A “DUTY COMPANY” OR
“QRF” AS AN SOP WHENEVER THE BATTALION IS IN A STATIC POSITION FOR AN EXTENDED
DURATION
DISCUSSION: While at Qalat Sikar airfield,
C Company was tasked on very short notice to provide an escort for the CO from
the airfield to RCT 1’s COC. The
timeline given in the Frag order from the Bn ROC was to be prepared to move in
25 minutes, an unrealistic timeline given the issues that needed to be
resolved.
RECOMMENDATION: When the battalion is in a static position for extended periods of time, assign responsibility for a “Duty Company” or QRF as SOP. The assignment of the duty company should include a readiness status, such as be prepared to move within 15 minutes. This will ensure that the duty company is capable of meeting tight timelines that will undoubtedly arise.
10. TOPIC: MEDCAP IN AN URBAN ENVIRONMENT
DISCUSSION: Third Platoon, C Company was
tasked to set up a MEDCAP to give assistance to the civilians of Shantytown
while maintaining a military presence in the town. Once the platoon stopped a
mob of civilians, mostly children swarmed the vehicle. Dismounted security was barely able to
contain and manage the civilians.
RECOMMENDATION: A MEDCAP in an urban
environment requires a company (-) to
conduct securely. One platoon will be
responsible for the MEDCAP and local security around the MEDCAP, while another
platoon is solely responsible for establishing a perimeter around the MEDCAP
station(s) and maintaining overwatch.
The security platoon should reinforce the perimeter with the vehicles.
The location should be one in an open area away from vehicle traffic.
Concertina wire should be set out 10-15 meters from the vehicles as a limit of
advance for the crowd and completely surround the perimeter. An ECP should be
established at the concertina. The
individual requesting aid should be searched at the ECP and escorted to the
center of the perimeter where the corpsman is staged and ready to give aid.
After care is complete, the individual is escorted to the concertina and another
one returns to get aid from the corpsman.
11. TOPIC: BLUE FORCE TRACKER
DISCUSSION: The Blue Force Tracker proved to be an outstanding navigation tool and a good back-up communication tool. Having the ability to pull up overhead imagery of a built up area that displays an icon symbolizing your location within the built up area enabled precision navigation. Navigation in built up areas and cross-country would have been greatly complicated without this tool.
RECOMMENDATION: The Marine Corps should procure this system permanently and field it down to the platoon level. Users of the BFT must use map, compass and odometer as a back up in the event the BFT goes down. Ideal BFT fielding for the company would be 5 systems: one for the Co HQ, one for each Plt HQ and one for each Plt point vehicle.
12.
TOPIC: CONTINUOUS COORDINATION
WITH ADJACENT UNITS
DISCUSSION: Third Platoon, C Company was tasked with
conducting a mounted patrol in a suburb north of
RECOMMENDATION: All patrol routes must be approved at the
battalion level. No patrol exits
friendly lines without required coordination being completed. At a minimum the Platoon Commander and
Vehicle Commanders should get a face to face with any maneuver unit that may
end up in their RAO to include the QRF and aircraft. Time should be set aside
to war-game unplanned linkups and unscheduled emergency extracts. Platoons need to be prepared with air-panels,
IR strobes and always approach other units in as non-threatening manner as possible.
If a unit is going into another unit’s zone coordination needs to be done at
the Bn ROC, Company to Company or, at a minimum, over Battalion TAC-1.
13. TOPIC: SETTING IN A BATTALION PERIMETER
DISCUSSION: Setting in the
battalion perimeter was extremely painful the first several times we did
it. Either every company would try to
set in their sectors simultaneously or the company would not wait until the
company it was tying into was set. This
was further complicated by a tendency by leaders to be hesitant to dismount
from their vehicles to get the platoons set. This would cause the company to
get the vehicles set in and then have to adjust because the companies on the
left or right were not set.
RECOMMENDATION: Through
trial and error, C Company found the following technique the most efficient for
setting in a perimeter/coil: wait for the company you’re tying into to get
set. Have the company call you on Bn TAC
when all their vehicles are set. Platoon
Commanders will then dismount, walk to the spot they want each vehicle and call
the vehicles, via radio or hand and arm signals, forward to its position one at
a time. This ensures that the leaders
have walked the ground prior to setting in the vehicles and prevents having to
adjust the vehicles’ positions unnecessarily.
14.
TOPIC: HEAVY MACHINE GUN TRAINING AND FIRE DISCIPLINE
DISCUSSION: The first time C Company took
enemy fire, every gun in the company opened up on the threat and fired many
more rounds than the amount needed to suppress the threat and gain fire superiority. Gunners virtually had a free rain to engage
targets until the company began stressing fire discipline from the top and
developing SOPs for engaging targets and ensuring fire discipline. This was due to a training shortfall. The company never formally trained on Alert,
Description, Direction, Range, Assignment, Control (ADDRAC) or fire
discipline. The company also failed to
develop SOPs for using ADDRAC as a tool for engaging targets.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
q Be
cognizant of the fact that the first time your Marines are taken under enemy
fire, their gut reaction will be to put as much firepower onto the threat as
possible. They’ll get better at
controlling fire discipline instinctively the more they “get used to” getting
shot at.
q Train
on ADDRAC and instill it as an SOP. This
is an easy hip-pocket training subject that can be done with virtually no
training aids.
q Train
your gunners to fire to gain suppression, assess and then fire if
necessary. Train the gunners to take a
full breath after each burst before putting another burst downrange. This will help them to pause to assess.
q Continue
to maintain proficiency by having quarterly machine gun shooting at the company
and battalion level. When the company has a shoot, the platoons can send four
or five Marines out to fire. It would
also be beneficial to send one or two Marines per platoon to advanced machine
gun courses.
15. TOPIC: COMBAT REPORTING
DISCUSSION: Recon Marines are trained on reporting procedures more than any other Marines. Despite this, the company’s combat reporting was grossly inadequate initially. Every report came as a narrative, vice a succinct, SALT REP, SITREP, or SPOTREP. This caused a delay in reporting the situation to battalion as the company tried to decipher the long narrative. The company had to continually instruct the teams and platoons to make their reports in standard formats, vice narratives.
RECOMMENDATION: Never accept any report in training other than specified formats. “Beat your Marines up” constantly on this issue to ensure its second nature.
16. TOPIC: DISCIPLINE AND CONTINUING ACTIONS
DISCUSSION:
Even disciplined Marines will “drop their pack” on discipline and
continuing actions when they’re tired.
The best Marine’s alertness and vigilance will slide as he becomes accustomed/acclimated to the combat environment. This occurred at all levels of leadership in
the battalion at one time or another. In
all my professional and mental preparation for combat, I always told myself
this would never happen to me, but on occasion, it did. It’s now my belief that this does not occur
due to malicious intent or laziness, instead it occurs because it’s human
nature.
RECOMMENDATION: Even the best Marines will
constantly have to be reminded to conduct continuing actions, remain vigilant
and constantly assess their tactical situation.
Leaders must continually evaluate their unit’s tactical situation and
continuing actions. To do this 24-7,
leaders must employ “back-ups” – other personnel who are specifically tasked to
check these actions, so when the primary’s level of alertness is dropped, the
issue is still being addressed. Develop
and use other tools like continuing action checklists that you can refer to
when you’re tired and “brain dead”.
17. TOPIC:
EQUIPMENT
DISCUSSION:
Equipment
which worked well:
a. AN/PAS-13
thermal sight.
b. AN/PVS-17B/C
infrared sight.
Equipment which did not work well:
a. PRC-148 MBITR radios. -The PRC-148 MBITR radios work well
during foot patrols, but are less effective during mobility operations.
Equipment needed:
a. M40A3
sniper rifle with rail system to employ PVS-9/10
night vision sights.
b.
Suppressors
c. Helmet
mounts
d. SASR .50
caliber sniper rifles.
RECOMMENDATION: We need to maximize our
night fighting capabilities by conducting additional training with NVG. Most
marines don’t know how to adjust the NVGs that we have to get the optimal
performance out of them. It would help the training effort if we were able to
mount the devise to the helmet in a more permanent and stable manner. The one
piece helmet mount would make using the NVGs much easier and help to change the
mind set of how and when they are used. We have a definite advantage over the
enemy in this area and should take advantage of it.
The
PRC-148 did not have the range or power needed to conduct vehicle operations.
We should use PRC-119s whenever possible.
Snipers
are a force multiplier in urban operations.
They bring outstanding observation skills to the battlefield. They can also take advantage of operating at
night. Suppressors can add to stealth
and at least one per team could be beneficial. The company’s one SASR is with 1st
platoon, who is currently attached to the 15th MEU. The weapon drastically increases the sniper’s
already stated advantage and effectiveness.
18. TOPIC: MINDSET FOR MOUNTED OPERATIONS
DISCUSSION: Mounted operations
require a huge readjustment of perspective, especially for reconnaissance units
accustomed to stealthy, foot-mobile patrolling. Limited attempts at concealment
can be made, such as driving blacked-out at night and using camouflage netting
when static, but the overall mindset must be one of force, not of stealth.
RECOMMENDATION: Train
aggressively; by developing a frontal attack mentality that the reconnaissance
Marines can understand and which will help them make the mental
adjustment. To use a football analogy,
develop a linebacker or fullback mindset.
One that is developed, the Marines will not be hesitant to take the
fight directly into the enemy’s face. Begin instruction at the Basic
Reconnaissance Course in mounted, light vehicle type patrolling and tactics in
order to meet the demands of this type of reconnaissance employment technique
in future operations.
19. TOPIC:
PROPER USE OF NIGHT VISION AND THERMAL EQUIPMENT
DISCUSSION: During night movement
and in stationary positions we, as a battalion, did not use the equipment that
we had on-hand to its potential. The limitations of the Iraqi’s night vision
capability should have been exploited to the fullest. Making night turn into day also helps our Marines spot and identify
targets.
RECOMMENDATION: During movement
the lead element should have the bulk of our night vision and thermal
capabilities. The lead vehicle should not carry the illuminators but the next
vehicle behind it should, this would illuminate the area to the front
increasing the range of vision by at least 100 meters. Stopping and observing with
the thermals would tell the Marines in the vehicles where to look for personnel
or targets up to 1000 meters ahead with ease. The amount of time that it takes
to conduct these stops would more than be worth the time lost traveling.
20. TOPIC:
PROPER EMPLOYMENT OF VEHICLES
DISCUSSION: Moving to the
Dispersal Area was the first time that the company tactically maneuvered with
all of its vehicles. The fact that the platoons were given vehicles and weapons
systems at last minute is known and explains why the teams appeared to be tied
to their vehicles. When contact was made and vehicles moved into position,
their team members stayed in the vehicle most of the time instead of
dismounting, except for the gunner who has to suck it up and employ his weapon
system.
RECOMMENDATION: A good
vehicle-patrolling package put into the company’s training plan prior to the
platoons deploying would cover all the areas that need it. There are plenty of
training areas in
21. TOPIC: OPTICS THAT MATCHES THE WEAPONS SYSTEMS
FOR PROPER TARGET IDENTIFICATION
DISCUSSION: The optics that we
had did not match the distance that we could employ the weapons systems. With
target I.D. being such an important thing, we need to look into purchasing
optics that will greatly increase the range that we can identify targets.
RECOMMENDATION: There are many optics on the market today and they are getting cheaper
every year. We should stay away from digital zoom and stick to optical zoom
power up to 40X after that digital zoom would be ok. Digital stabilization is a
must for any optic that is going to have that much optical power and having a
simple plug in for taking digital stills through any optic would assist in
confirmation. These items are on the market at reasonable prices.
22. TOPIC:
DISCUSSION: The M-4 and M-16 were
limited to what they could engage while traveling in vehicles. The standoff
that the .50 gave us was great but the other weapons that we had could not be
employed. The snipers were at about max range but could have taken shots if
necessary.
RECOMMENDATION: If the M-16A4
with high powered optics can reach out and touch the enemy at long distances
then we need to have a few in each team. Don’t get me wrong I think the M-4 is
a great weapon for in city fighting from 100 to 300 meters. A weapon mix may be
what we need to look at.
23. TOPIC: MOBILIZATION OF RESERVE COMPANY
DISCUSSION: The company
as a whole was prepared for the mobilization process. The mobilization mindset
had been previously instilled in the minds of all hands so when the word came
down, there were no real surprises. Solid success on the last MORDT and plenty
of lead time given the current world situation negated any real issues of
refusal or delay of mobilization orders. Problematic issues included the
accession of site-lined (SGU vs. SGV) personnel to the deployment roster and
the administration required in the gaining of corpsmen. The
Inspector/Instructor staff did a good job of supporting the mobilization
effort. All hands including both the company and I&I
staffs worked fairly well in concert towards a successful mobilization.
RECOMMENDATION: The single greatest improvement
to the mobilization process would be to have the family readiness brief given
the FIRST day of mobilization, rather than the LAST night. The negative impact
this had on precious remaining time left with loved ones as well as time left
in which to accomplish critical family readiness tasks was felt throughout the
chain of command. Furthermore, the family readiness brief needs to be carefully
tailored to fit the specific needs as well as realities of Marine families. By
using the organic assets on site at Kirtland AFB, many families received
information that led them to believe that MWR issues would be commensurate with
the standard of living that the Air Force enjoys – a marked contrast from what
the Marines enjoy. All personnel assigned to RUC 14705 should have been
mobilized. Navy corpsmen need to be mobilized with the company from day one,
not handled through a totally different system – this matter caused the company
to deploy forward without three of its four corpsmen due to the existing
timeline. Focus on MORDT preparedness was crucial.
24. TOPIC: ACTIONS AT THE STAGING INTEGRATION AREA
DISCUSSION: Traditionally, the expected
time given for a reserve unit to complete preparations prior to being forward
deployed into a theater of operations is approximately thirty days. In this
instance, the company, in effect, had six days. This was wholly inadequate
given the mission and equipment requirements needed by the company to fall in
on its active duty battalion. T/O and T/E shortfalls will be discussed later.
With the entire battalion and almost the entire division already in theater,
support for training was virtually non-existent to minimal, at best. The availability of ranges, ammunition, and
most other items of training support were generally unavailable. The battalion
rear party did a great job in providing what limited support they could, but
had the company been at the SIA for the full thirty days, effective training
would not have been possible. Company D was unable to adequately prepare for
its mission upon joining the battalion.
RECOMMENDATION: While a 30-day SIA workup
period would be desirable, as in this case it is not always possible. In this
event, it is recommended that the unit be mobilized at the earliest possible
date, preferably while elements of the GFC are still at the SIA in order to
facilitate a worthwhile workup for the reserve unit prior to being forward
deployed. Should the GFC already be forward deployed, contingencies must be in
place to help facilitate adequate training upon the unit’s arrival.
25. TOPIC: TABLE OF
ORGANIZATION REQUIREMENTS FOR RESERVE COMPANY
DISCUSSION: Guidance from the GFC was
fairly specific regarding the personnel assigned to the company deploying. Of
particular note was the fact that site-lined personnel (SGU vs. SGV) were left
behind. Forgotten in this was the reality that by virtue of being a part of the
company, these personnel are already functioning members of the command and
perform critical tasks required for the company’s success (communicators watch
standers, etc.). As a result of this decision, the headquarters platoon was
significantly under strength. Upon arrival in theater, it became immediately
apparent that all available personnel could have been gainfully employed despite
their MOS or site line distribution.
RECOMMENDATION: If companies in 4th
Recon Bn are to maintain the “habitual relationship” concept of employment,
then the T/O of the company must mirror that of the companies in the battalion
with which it has the habitual relationship. To do otherwise would engineer a
significant disadvantage for the reserve company from the outset and pose
problems with the integration to the GFC. It is ill advised to “break up” the
company based solely on “site line” issues. Either do away with site lining
personnel altogether, or be prepared to deploy the company in total.
26. TOPIC: T/E
REQUIREMENTS FOR RESERVE COMPANY
DISCUSSION: Company D had been chopped to
join a battalion which had been tasked with performing a non-traditional
mission: A mobile, heavy/medium machine gun-mounted capability was identified.
Early in 2002, the company was tasked with developing a mobile reconnaissance
capability, but no additional vehicle assets were provided to give adequate
lift for the company nor were any medium or heavy machine guns provided. The
GFC identified the requirements in late November of 2002; still no additional
vehicle or weapons assets were sourced. The command was advised by HHQ that all
vehicles (and weapons) would be sourced and provided. The end state of this
discussion was that the company was unable to cross the LD with the rest of the
battalion. The vehicle assets that were sourced for the company (by the I&I) were sourced after the company had
already left CONUS. Further, these vehicles were sourced from across multiple
units in 1st Marine Division; in unknown condition and reliability.
The company’s heavy and medium machine guns also had to be sourced – in this
case, they were sourced from the reserve artillery regiment – also after the
company was forward deployed. The company’s vehicles and weapons did not arrive
until several days after the commencement of hostilities. Several more days
were required to upload mission essential equipment and ammunition, mount the
machine guns and make all other necessary preparations for conducting combat
operations.
RECOMMENDATION: It is absolutely essential
that the T/E of the company mirror that of its habitual relationship unit. In
this case, the company was unable to link up with the battalion equipped
properly and properly able to prepare, train, and develop the tactics,
techniques and procedures necessary to be an effective attachment for the
battalion. This deficiency was offset by a strong mindset and will to succeed
on the part of all hands. When equipment finally did arrive, the company was
forced to complete preparations for combat without being able to execute
rehearsals, test-fires, and all those other traditional preparations for combat
that the rest of the battalion enjoyed.
27. TOPIC: INTEGRATION OF
INSPECTOR INSTRUCTOR STAFF AND OTHER AUGMENTEES
DISCUSSION: Despite considerable debate on
this topic, no real value was gained in terms of the company’s ability to
integrate and conduct operations with its GFC by the integration of I&I
staff members into the company T/O. For Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Operations
Chief, Company Gunnery Sergeant, Communications Chief, and Corpsman were
I&I Staff members. The presence of the communications chief was the single
exception, as the company did not possess a properly qualified comm. chief.
Several augmentees were joined to the company; one officer, one staff NCO and
one NCO. Again the overall value to the command was questionable.
RECOMMENDATION: In the final analysis, the
commanding officer should be the final authority in determining which
non-company personnel should be augmented as he is the best judge of their
value to the command. SGU-coded and non-MCT Marines were not allowed to deploy
with the company, though essential while clearly non-essential personnel
deployed. Company D executed all missions and taskings thoroughly,
professionally and honorably during both combat and stabilization/humanitarian
operations. The company sustained no friendly WIA’s or KIA’s. The concepts
pertaining to mobilization, deployment, and training of reserve component units
has, in large part, been validated.
28. TOPIC:
PERSONNEL
DISCUSSION: There was a huge “value-added”
by school-trained snipers and Special Amphibious Reconnaissance Corpsmen. Snipers and medical personnel were the most
involved and most critical players during the highest points of combat.
RECOMMENDATION: School-train or even
cross-train personnel as much as possible on the skills of sniping and medical
treatment.
29. TOPIC: INTELLIGENCE RELATED TRAINING
a. SUB-TOPIC:
SOFTWARE.
DISCUSSION: Over the past year,
the S-2 integrated Special Operation Forces Mission Planning Environment –
Maritime (SOFMPE-M) software training into the POI of battalion level team
leader (TL) courses. The primary program
of choice to teach, that facilitated small-unit mission planning through
digitized maps and imagery was Falconview, developed under the Pre-Flight
Planning Software (PFPS) by Georgia Tech Research Institute. Also introduced was
PFPS Version 3.2’s Combat Flight Planning Software (CFPS) which provides
commanders and team leaders the ability to plan and time detailed routes while
viewing effects of digital terrain elevation data (DTED) as well as Controlled
Imagery Base (CIB). Though students of
the TL course were forced to use the software during a mission planning
practical application and subsequent confirmation brief, the skills were not
reinforced periodically enough to maintain any level of proficiency. Additionally, this “refresher” instruction
should be extended to all platoon and company commanders (0203s receive
training on PFPS as part of their MOS pipeline) for their use in detailed
mission planning as well. One other
program that will also increase our small unit leader’s self-sufficiency is the
Solar, Lunar, Almanac Prediction (SLAP) program. SLAP uses algorithms to calculate/predict
astronomical data (sunrise, sunset, illumination, EENT, BMNT, etc) and
extremely user friendly.
RECOMMENDATION: TL’s should be introduced to this software
and its capabilities and at a minimum, should be required to integrate it into
their mission planning for training evolutions at least one time per
month. Though primarily an S-2 function,
all officers should receive initial and periodic training on PFPS. The program has tremendous utility to
commanders as well as other staff commodities (S-3, S-4, S-6). This effort will increase autonomy and
promote decentralization in planning across the commanders and staff. At a
minimum, our leaders should understand how to load and manipulate map data -
including DTED and CIB, be able to build an overlay, and construct, manipulate,
and calculate a route.
30. TOPIC:
SYSTEMS
a. SUB-TOPIC: C4I.
DISCUSSION: Current T/O & E of a reconnaissance
battalion does not include any data-link equipment (MUCS, Smart-T, TRC-170, 93-
Spoke Van, Trojan Spirit II) that enables the
battalion to independently establish Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
(SIPRNET) or other networks to higher or adjacent units. This places the battalion at a significant
information disadvantage when operating independently, away from the Division
G-6/G-2. Three vital capabilities that
“conductivity” would provide the battalion include: SIPRNET, classified e-mail,
and the ability to view and manage the Common Operational Picture (COP) via
Command Control Personal Computer (C2PC).
Approximately two
weeks passed between the time Recon Battalion crossed the line of departure and
when they linked up with The Division Main just outside of
RECOMMENDATION: Division must
understand and compensate for the fact that separate maneuver battalions do not
have the same data connectivity as the RCTs.
Their TTP for information dissemination and duration of taskings must be
adjusted accordingly. Increased
connectivity will undoubtedly provide the commander and his staff with an
invaluable resource when it comes to tracking the battle or coordinating future
operations. However, the increase in
size and weight of the unit could be negatively impacted. An effort needs to be
made to investigate the possibility of procuring the minimum, appropriate
equipment in order to establish some of these vital links. The data requirement of modern combat will
only increase; therefore it is imperative that good data be collected on costs
and personnel increases before the concept is developed and briefed to a forum
such as the ROAG. Reconnaissance
battalions should not be left behind in this regard.
b. SUB-TOPIC:
EQUIPMENT TO PROCURE (PLOTTER, ZIP STICKS)
DISCUSSION: The Dell laptop purchased by Division G-2
specifically for this deployment for each MSE proved its weight in gold time
and time again. Its speed (2+ GHz
processor and 1 GB of RAM) and versatility enabled the S-2 to cut routes using
1m CIB on the hoods or front seats of HMMWVs without delay. Though not a hardened CF-28 “Toughbook,” the
Dell survived the sands of
RECOMMENDATION: Fast, versatile systems in the S-2 are a must
given the amount of data stored and retrieved by digital mapping programs such
as Falconview. Recommend the upcoming
NMCI issue proportionally accommodate that need. With regard to data transfer and file sharing
in the desert, it is recommended that the battalion open purchase “zip memory
sticks.” At under $100, these tiny
devices (1/3 the size of an index finger) can plug and play into any USB port
and hold up to 100MB of data without programming software, cables, or plastic
bags (used to store all of our 3.5” floppy disks). They take up minimal space, do not scratch
like CDs, and won’t fail after 2 uses, like the floppies. The other item to procure for both rear and
deployed operations is a plotter. The
battalion S-2 used to own one but it was evacuated to 11th Marines almost two
years ago. Start-up costs would exceed
$1000 and ink is not cheap but having the ability to reproduce large scale
graphics, including maps, will facilitate the S-2’s product development mission
and cut down on battalion requests to combat camera.
c. SUB-TOPIC: BLUE
FORCE TRACKER AND S2
DISCUSSION: The interest of this sub-topic demands an
RECOMMENDATION: The performance
of the BFT in this campaign is sure to win it a spot in every HMMWV shortly
down the road. Although its capabilities
have been proven with extreme success, it can go one step further: RFT or,
“Red” Force Tracker. On rare occasion,
the BFT did display threat icons, be it confirmed armor formations or known
surface-to-surface missile sites, but these icons were not frequent
enough. Again, with conductivity and
C2PC, RCTs are able to track the complete COP as it is maintained by higher echelons
(Division and MEF). Considering the fact
that these upper echelons also have pipes to theater and national level
overhead collections platforms contributes to the validity of that battlefield
“picture’s” completeness as our assets know it.
Recall however, the pipes that feed the COP are established in
stationary COCs but the BFT is available on the move. If we conceptually combine the two
capabilities, the COP becomes available in every passenger seat of every
vehicle in which it is installed.
Theoretically, this would require some inter-service, intelligence and
systems personnel to manage the database but it is not far out from reach.
31. TOPIC: EMPLOYMENT
a. SUB-TOPIC: T/O
IN FORWARD
DISCUSSION: For the first couple of weeks, the battalion
operated C2 from the forward command element whose personnel configuration had
depth in every billet vice one, intelligence.
Given the lack of systems and at some times, nets, the intelligence
officer could conduct sustained ops without fail thus justifying this T/O.
RECOMMENDATION: If the mission were to call for a battalion
(-) contingent where the forward element served as the C2, then, depending on
anticipated duration, the intelligence section would require at least one other
Marine to cover the sustained watch, conduct debriefs, etc.
b. SUB-TOPIC:
DRAGON-EYE
DISCUSSION: Bottom line, this asset was under-flown
perhaps due to the fast pace of battalion’s maneuver. By thinking outside of the box, Dragon Eye
could be flown in support of maneuver.
There is no rule that states the UAV needs to return to the same point
from which it was launched therefore, why not employ the asset on the move by
keeping it two kilometers in front of the lead trace with a planned landing
point based on projected speed and time/space analysis?
RECOMMENDATION: Knowing that to plan, launch, and execute a
mission takes no more than 10 minutes, one could continue to plan waypoints and
loops that coincide with forward movement.
This way, with a battery that lasts an estimated 50 minutes, one mission
could cover 30 km (22 km beyond the “inside the box” 8km range –whose
limitation is based on aircraft to antenna alone). As long as the UAV operator remained no more
than 8 km from the aircraft, the convoy could continue to use the UAV to screen
forward or to the flank of its movement.
And if the convoy had to stop or speed up, the UAV could be dynamically
re-tasked to adjust. Recommend
experimenting with this concept aboard
32. TOPIC: SUPPORT FROM HIGHER
a. SUB-TOPIC:
TRANSLATORS
DISCUSSION: Two translators per battalion might have
sufficed had one of the two not departed prematurely. The fluid environment coupled with a
predominantly asymmetric threat meant that our best I&W consistently came
from spontaneous interviews with locals and/or EPWs and DPs. Although not vetted, these sources often
provided accurate information on the enemy and terrain, particularly when it
came to Fedayeen and Ba’ath Party ambushes, a critical piece to our
intelligence picture and subsequent decision making process.
RECOMMENDATION: Even with a pool
of Foreign Area Officers (FAO), Regional Area Officers (RAO), Iraqi Freedom Fighters
(IFF), and Human Exploitation Teams (HET), there are never enough
linguists/translators to go around.
Prior to Phase IV, our battalion could get by with two interpreters (one
up front, one in the middle or rear of the convoy) however, we made due with
one. When traveling on restricted
routes, the battalion was often delayed while waiting for the “translator to
appear” as he walked from one end of the vehicular column to the other. Also, at times, we had a
influx of EPW’s which also required a translator. Infantry battalions, who possess
significantly more firepower than Recon Battalion, and are often not employed
forward or to the flank of the Division, do not require an equal amount or more
interpreters. Recommend this argument be
captured for future reference when assigning interpreters throughout the
Division.
33.
TOPIC: OPERATIONAL TEMPO DURING TRAINING
DISCUSSION: During Operation Free Iraq,
this battalion was unprepared to conduct missions at the operational tempo
required. Although we quickly adapted to the situation, our mindset going into
this campaign was wrong. Had we looked harder at the operational tempo of
previous conflicts during the maneuver warfare area we would have realized that
1. We would not be tasked with a traditional reconnaissance mission. 2. That we
would have to make changes to the way we are structured for combat. 3. That our
mindset was wrong. We would have to become more mentally agile, able to adjust
on the move and during execution. Finally we would have to be more aggressive
in nature.
RECOMMENDATION: Speed up the planning
process during training. Intentionally leave out key points in the enemy situation,
or provide wrong information to force the marines to think on their feet. Give
them the normal work up or preparation time for a traditional reconnaissance
mission, but task them with maneuver missions as well, in which case planning
time should be restrictive in nature.
34.
TOPIC: C2 AND LOGISTICS
DISCUSSION: During OIF the Battalion conducted operations
and logistics from the
RECOMMENDATION: While the ROC/LOC is a good setup for the
detailed planning and precise execution of traditional reconnaissance
operations our mission was more tailored toward a COC where the S-3 is the
center hub and the spokes are all other commodities passing and receiving
information through him. A setup like
this would allow for better staff planning and overall support of the battalion
through increased SA.
35. TOPIC: EMBARKATION PERSONNEL
DISCUSSION: During OIF the Battalion
conducted its first full unit deployment since its reformation. This was done without an embarkation NCO that
the battalion rates thus drawing from other commodity sections to pick up the
slack. LCpl Cowee was the sole 0431 in
the Battalion at the time.
RECOMMENDATION: Recommend the
Battalion be staffed to T/O for its 0431s.
We currently rate a Sgt and a Cpl 0431.
There is also a U coded SSgt 0431 on the T/E. The newly arrived PFC that checked in during
OIF should help stop the bleeding once we arrive back to
36.
TOPIC: EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS TO OPERATE AS AN INDEPENDENT
BATTALION
DISCUSSION: In OIF the Battalion was tasked to operate as
a separate maneuver battalion. With this
came equipment and personnel requirements that we had not had to deal with in
the past. IOT ensure that the Battalion
was mobile and could accomplish the assigned mission successfully the following
gear and personnel had to be attached:
(4) HMMWVs
(2)
MRC-145s
(5)
7-ton cargo trucks (with reservist drivers)
(6)
(1)
900 gal fuel sixcon
(4)
MEP16 generators (with one generator operator/mechanic)
(2)
116 trailers to pull the generators
RECOMMENDATION: The Battalion T/E should be filled to reflect
what we rate, especially in a time of war.
Adjustments should be made on the battalion side to identify the
requirements beyond what the T/E allows.
37. TOPIC: DETERMINATION
AND FULFILLMENT OF LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS
DISCUSSION: The determination of the
battalion’s internal logistical requirements worked well throughout the
operation, once the “company gunny” mindset was broken. DOS is not the recommended way to track
supplies on a battalion level. The
companies turned in their maximum carrying capacity and the amount they had on
hand of Class I and III. Class V was
kept in form of a MUREP. All were turned
in on a daily basis. With this
information we could push supplies to the company’s based off a calculated
consumption rates and percentages on hand rather guess what a DOS was for a
particular company. This level of detail
was not expected by all due to the fact that for the majority of
battalion/division exercises we take to the field what is needed and when it
runs out, we come home.
RECOMMENDATION: Extend the length of exercises IOT truly
exercise the supply and logistics sections.
38. TOPIC: COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT LIAISON CELL
DISCUSSION: The Battalion was in a constant support
relationship shift from the moment we arrived in
RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that the Battalion attach a liaison
cell to the CSS headquarters. This will
allow him to adjust to any shift in our reporting relationships and ensure that
our requirements are not lost or forgotten about as we shift. A Sgt could handle any and all supply work
that was done in the field during OIF.
Our higher echelon of Supply knowledge will better serve us in the
future as liaison cells with our higher supporting agencies. Communication between the battalion and them
will be priority witch will further expedite supply support.
39. TOPIC:
IRIDIUM CELL PHONE USED FOR SUPPLY/MIMMS DATA
DISCUSSION: Requisitions were submitted
over the Iridium Cell Phone to a webpage set up by CSSG-11. The CSS Unit would pull and load the Atlas
Data into the Mainframe Computer and post the subsequent info to the same
webpage for us to review.
RECOMMENDATION: The concept was good but
the parts were just not available and/or couldn’t be tracked. This idea needs to be further looked into for
all aspects of data transfer, it has promise.
40. TOPIC: ATTACHING MECHANICS TO THE LINE
COMPANIES
DISCUSSION: Each line company was attached (1) 3521 Motor
Vehicle Mechanic during OIF. His mission
was to make quick fixes and assessments of broken vehicles. If the assessment of the broken vehicle was
above his ability to fix, due to tools or parts, a call was made to the
Battalion contact team for assistance.
This method of vehicle maintenance saved to battalion and its
maintenance section a great deal of time throughout OIF.
RECOMMENDATION: Recommend this method be continued in the
future. The Battalion needs to purchase
(1) general mechanic tool kit per mechanic it has.
41.
TOPIC: VIASAT AND PSC-5 FOR LOGISTIC DATA COMMUNICATION
DISCUSSION: Our S-6 section did a great job of schooling
up the S-4/S-1/Supply sections on the use of the PSC-5 ViaSAT for the passing
of data to our supporting agencies. Not
having access to SIPR net, this method of communicating proved invaluable.
RECOMMENDATION: Further training needs to be conducted in the
rear to ensure that each watch stander in the LOC is familiar with the
operations of the ViaSAT as well as all other communications equipment it may
have to utilize. Further time needs to
be devoted to TACCHAT for the use of Administrative/ Logistical data transfer.
42. TOPIC: AERIAL RESUPPLY / AIR DELIVERY
DISCUSSION: The Commander of CSSG-11 briefed the
Battalion that we would primarily be resupplied via air that the FSSG had in
DS. During OIF we received (0) air
resupplies. We did, however, have our
extra NBC suits palletized and prepared for air delivery due to the fact that
we did not have sufficient lift to carry them ourselves. In the event that we needed the second suits,
they were to be air dropped in the vicinity of our decontamination site.
RECOMMENDATION: Don’t rely on air, no
matter who tells you that its good to go. If it wasn’t for our secondary means of
resupply we would have spent more than a day of (1) MRE a day.
43.
TOPIC: IRIDIUM PHONE AND ACCESSORIES
DISCUSSION: The Iridium satellite
cell phone proved itself to be a valuable tool as a coordination asset and last
line of communication during Iraqi Freedom, but not an infallible one. On numerous occasions calls could not be
completed, continually receiving prompts to “Try Again Later” or forwarding to
a mailbox, even during comm checks where the phones were placed side by side. There were periods where the battalion could
not get any unit in the Division via Iridium phone. It’s possible the employment of so many
phones in theater overloaded the system at times (will review problems with the
manufacturer upon return to Conus).
Making secure calls with the “secure sleeves” also proved to be a 50/50
endeavor. The Data Kits the battalion
purchased before deployment proved their value, allowing Supply and the MMO to
coordinate with various service support elements and exchange documents and log
stats while waiting at
RECOMMENDATION: Upon return to Conus the S-6 will continue to
work with the manufacture in regards to troubleshooting problems and operations
to ensure the phones are utilized to their fullest extent. Iridium phone operations (voice and data)
will also be incorporated into weekly communications training.
44.
TOPIC: TRANSCEIVER POWER UNIT AC/DC/BT-TR-1
DISCUSSION: The communication
platoon employed four of these units in the battalion main ROC during Iraqi
Freedom. The four that
were on the
RECOMMENDATION: For ROC
operations, the platoon will continue to utilize the AC/DC converters whenever
generator support is available.
45.
TOPIC: BLUE FORCE TRACKER REMOTED
TO THE ROC
DISCUSSION: The Blue Force Tracker
was a great tool on the move, but once the battalion main was established, we
had to have our ROC radio watch or other battalion personnel continually
checking the vehicle terminal for traffic.
RECOMMENDATION: The battalion needs the hardware to remote
the Blue Force Tracker into our operations center, as it is in the Division COC
(currently making inquiries to the G-6).
46.
TOPIC: PSC-5’S
DISCUSSION: The battalion had
great success with our two PSC-5’s which were employed on the DIV TAC 2 and DIV
CMD 2 nets. The battalion did temp loan
one from Comm Company for minimal redundancy, but there were several times
during Iraqi Freedom where additional assets were required when the forward and
main were employed simultaneously, forcing the Commanding Officer to split
assets between the forward and main elements.
RECOMMENDATION: The battalion should immediately be fielded
more PSC-5’s as per the current T/E.
47.
TOPIC: PRC-150 3RD
GENERATION SOFTWARE AND HARRIS TAC CHAT SOFTWARE
DISCUSSION: This software upgrade
completed at
RECOMMENDATION: Upon return to